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Goethe’s Archaeology of the 
Modern Curse (Orest, Faust, 
Manfred)
❦
Frauke Berndt & Sebastian Meixner
Today the curse has disappeared from epistemological memory. We 
curse people and things without an institution that would guarantee 
its success. Because of this, curses also cannot fail; instead, they have 
degenerated into profanities and insults. The curse has become his-
torical. The current interdisciplinary ensemble of cultural studies has 
explored an archaeology of the curse based on speech-act theory.1 
In this context, there has primarily been an interest in pre-modern 
literature and especially for Shakespeare’s royal dramas, in which the 
institutions of the curse serve as the background.2 But even Johann 
Wolfgang Goethe—the Enlightenment humanist and classicist—can 
impart significant insights into the archaeology of the curse since 
his dramas show how the institutions constitutive of the curse have 
changed. After (I) elucidating the theoretical background of the 
curse, we will describe (II) the paradigmatic structures of the curse 
in Iphigenie auf Tauris: Ein Schauspiel (1787) and (III) its syntagmatic 
variations in both Faust: Eine Tragödie (1808) and Goethe’s partial 
translation (1823) of Lord Byron’s Manfred: A Dramatic Poem (1817).
1Friedrich, Peter and Schneider, Manfred. “Einleitung: “Sprechkrafttheorien” oder 
Eid und Fluch zwischen Recht, Sprachwissenschaft, Literatur und Philosophie.” Fatale 
Sprachen: Eid und Fluch in Literatur- und Rechtsgeschichte. Ed. Peter Friedrich and Manfred 
Schneider. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2009: 7–19.
2Quiring, Björn. Shakespeares Fluch: Die Aporien ritueller Exklusion im Königsdrama der 
englischen Renaissance. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2009.
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I. Theories of the curse
The Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens notes: “Fluch ist eine 
Redeformel, durch welche man Unheil auf einen anderen oder auf 
dessen Habe oder auch auf sich selbst herabwünscht.”3 Such impreca-
tions are based on a “magical worldview” in which words become 
or can become actions.4 This definition presupposes a model of com-
munication that takes the curse, cursers, and accursed into account; 
it coincides with a model of communication that is also foundational 
for analyzing drama, so a methodological perspective already suggests 
a continuity between the curse and drama. And there is cursing in 
dramas; for this reason, drama is in a position to impart insights into 
the economy of curses and cursing. Drama reacts to “real” cursing 
by constantly observing and reflecting on it. Expressed differently, 
dramatic curses are second-order curses, and so they always have a 
dramaturgical and poetological dimension.
On the basis of communication theory, the curse is assigned two 
semantic roles: the curser takes on the role of the grammatical agent 
and the accursed that of the grammatical patient.5 In cultural studies, 
the two are problematically called the perpetrator and the victim, which 
presupposes a moral valuation. In contrast, Maximilian Oettinger 
refers to the curser as the victim and the accursed as the perpetrator. 
The curse would then be the ultima ratio defense after all other legal 
means have been exhausted, allowing the powerless victim to make a 
stand against suffered injustices and, at least to some extent, to regain 
agency. The curse is also the highest punishment and most powerful 
weapon. Because of the affectivity that such a communicative situation 
creates, the curse veers into the vicinity of revenge.6
But the perpetrator–victim model can just as legitimately be reversed. 
The curser is the perpetrator who expels the victim from the social 
community, because the victim has committed a wrong. Either this 
expulsion is connected to a violation against the world order, so that 
the curse repels a threat to the community from within, or the curse 
3Beth, K. “Fluch.” Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens. Ed. Hanns Bächtold-
Stäubli. Vol. 2. Berlin, Leipzig: Weltbild, 2000: 1636–52, here 1636.
4Beth. Fluch: 1637. All translations by Anthony Mahler unless otherwise noted.
5Grewendorf, Günther, Fritz Hamm, and Wolfgang Sternefeld. Sprachliches Wissen: 
Eine Einführung in moderne Theorien der grammatischen Beschreibung. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1987: 190.
6Oettinger, Maximilan. Der Fluch:Vernichtende Rede in sakralen Gesellschaften der jüdischen 
und christlichen Tradition. Konstanz: Hartung-Gorre, 2007: 2–5; Vedder, Ulrike. “Der 
Fluch als Schuld und Übertragung.” Bonds: Schuld, Schulden und andere Verbindlichkeiten. 
Ed. Thomas Macho. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2014: 509–20, here 514.
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blindsides the victim because the perpetrator represents the “Other” 
of the community, as in fairy tales where the perpetrator is usually an 
“evil” that threatens the community from the outside. In brief, the 
perpetrator–victim model relies on a moral or judicial valuation of 
the situation, while the formal model of semantic roles starts with the 
curse itself and makes attributions based on its structure.
In any case, both models presuppose an institution that makes the 
curse a curse. This institution must be recognized within the commu-
nity from which the accursed is excluded and into which the curser 
is included. This institution is ordinarily represented by gods, a god, 
or other higher powers that support the curse and ensure its enforce-
ment.7 Such institutions must be absolute institutions for those that 
are cursed—they are a matter of faith. The concept of performativity 
mediates between the speech act and the institution, a performativity 
which Judith Butler has defined by three aspects: anticipation, repeti-
tion, and ritualization.8 Martin Hagemeier has transferred these three 
aspects to Cornelius Castoriadis’s concept of the institution.9 In its 
enforcement, one can assume that the curse institutionalizes a public 
sphere of performance;10 in other words, without the institution—and 
this should be stressed—there is no curse.
The claim that the curse prescribes semantic roles is mirrored in 
all attempts to classify it linguistically as a Redeformel or formulaic 
language, such as in the Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens. 
In the Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, one thus 
finds performatives in the entry on fluch, which directly refers to the 
corresponding figures of thought (figurae sententiae) in rhetoric: “m. 
exsecratio, imprecatio, maledictum, ahd. fluoch, mhd. vluoch, alts. fluoc, 
nd. flok, nnl. vloek. mangelt goth. ags. engl. altn. schw. dän., worüber mehr 
beim verbum. man sagt ein schwerer, harter, bitterer, tiefer, herzlicher 
fluch und dem fluch, der verwünschung steht der wunsch, der segen, dem 
verwünschen, devovere das wünschen, vovere gegenüber”.11 Not only does 
the entry refer to the form of the curse; it also draws connections 
7Dorschel, Andreas. “Entwurf einer Theorie des Fluchens.” Variations 23 (2015): 
167–75, here 167.
8Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and 
London: Routledge, 1999: xiv–xv.
9Hagemeier, Martin. Dem Chaos eine Form geben: Eine Einführung zu Cornelius Castoriadis. 
Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2014: 152.
10Tucker, Kenneth. “From the Imaginary to Subjectivation: Castoriadis and Touraine 
on the Performative Public Sphere.” Thesis Eleven 83 (2005): 42–60.
11Grimm, Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm. Deutsches Wörterbuch. Vol. 3. Leipzig: Hirzel, 
1854–1961, p. 1827.
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between the curse and the wish, on the one hand, and the curse and 
the blessing, on the other.
On the basis of its linguistic form, eighteenth-century rhetoric 
understands the curse (exsecratio), as Dietmar Till points out, as a 
special form of apostrophe.12 For apostrophe is the figure of thought 
that has been employed within the system of rhetoric since antiquity 
to discuss the performativity of figures of thought in general. This is 
because apostrophe is the figure of interruption in communication. 
In drama, one describes it as a form of aversio that shifts the perspec-
tive of the communicative situation with regard to sender, message, 
and receiver. In this shift, aversio indicates a change of addressee: a 
dramatic character turns away from the other dramatis personae and 
toward a different addressee who is not located on the level of the 
internal communication system and is usually the audience on the 
level of the external communication system.13 A triadic structure thus 
underlies the dramaturgy of the curse.
But this dramaturgical analysis does not do justice to the actual logic 
of apostrophe, which Jonathan Culler characterizes as follows: “[I]t 
makes its point by troping not on the meaning of a word but on the 
circuit or situation of communication itself.”14 The figure thus switches 
from representation to presence: “Apostrophe is not the representation 
of an event; if it works it produces a fictive, discursive event.”15 And 
apostrophe itself becomes an institution exactly through this “power 
of poetry to make something happen.”16 From this it follows that, as 
an apostrophe, the curse presupposes a triangular structure in which 
the speaker turns away from what is immediately opposite and turns 
toward the institution that guarantees the fulfillment of the curse and 
is even often named within the curse itself.
The institutional form of the curse, which rhetoric presupposes, is 
lost in the theories currently applied to the curse, especially in speech-
act theory. In How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin differentiates 
between locution, illocution, and perlocution. While locution simply 
12Till, Dietmar. “Exsecratio.” Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik. Ed. Gert Ueding 
and Walter Jens. Vol. 3. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996: 181–83.
13Pfister, Manfred. Das Drama. 11th ed. Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2001: 20–22.
14Culler, Jonathan. “Apostrophe.” Diacritics 7 (1977): 59–69, here 59; Meixner, 
Sebastian. “Die Notwendigkeit der Apostrophe: Metaleptische Strukturen in Johann 
Wolfgang Goethes ‘Die Leiden des jungen Werthers.’” Ästhetik des Zufalls: Ordnungen 
des Unvorhersehbaren in Literatur und Theorie. Ed. Christoph Pflaumbaum, Carolin Rocks, 
Christian Schmitt and Stefan Tetzlaff. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2015: 
121–37.
15Culler. Apostrophe: 68.
16Culler. Apostrophe: 62.
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refers to the utterance, illocution describes a conventional orientation 
of this act, and perlocution traces the effects of the act on the world. 
The curse connects illocution and perlocution like almost no other 
speech act. In his last lecture, Austin categorizes the curse within what 
he calls “behabitive” illocutionary speech acts, which announce a reac-
tion to the behavior of others. From this perspective, the curse refers 
less to the accursed and more to the curser, because it constitutes the 
posture of the curser with regard to the accursed.
According to Austin, the curse is thus a negative form of a wish 
that is at first entirely independent of whether or not the content 
of the curse will come to pass, that is, whether or not it will be ful-
filled.17 Although the curse therefore plays merely a subordinate 
role in current speech-act theories,18 it releases a performative force 
with enormous consequences for both the curser and the accursed, 
and—as the fairy tale again teaches us—it usually cannot be taken 
back, but rather only redirected or mitigated. If a curse is successful, 
then it is certainly one of the most powerful illocutionary acts since it 
entails immediate effects as a perlocutionary act. Exactly in the sense 
of Austin’s “doing something by saying something,” the grammatical 
patient is immediately under a curse: he or she is accursed as soon 
as the curse is expressed.19
Giorgio Agamben investigates this force of the curse in The Sacra-
ment of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath, a volume in his homo sacer 
project. In contrast to the Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens, 
Agamben argues that the curse cannot be explained using the para-
digm of the “magico-religious.”20 On the contrary, it is the oath (and 
with it the curse) “as originary performative experience of the word, 
that can explain religion […].”21 Accordingly, Agamben questions the 
“immanent function” of the curse and thereby returns to its linguistic 
form, which he also recognizes, following the rhetorical tradition, as 
an apostrophe.22 At the same time, he directly connects the curse with 
its opposite, the blessing (sacratio), a connection which the Deutsches 
17Austin, John. How to do things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered at 
Harvard University in 1955. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962: 149–51 and 159–60.
18The oath, however, is prominent in Charles Sanders Peirce, a forerunner of 
speech-act theory. Martens, Ekkehard. Texte der Philosophie des Pragmatismus. Stuttgart: 
Reclam, 1975: 8.
19Hermanns, Fritz: “Sprechkrafttheorie: Zu einem Fall von Sprachmagie in der 
Sprachwissenschaft.” Grazer linguistische Studien 23 (1985): 35–63.
20Agamben, Giorgio. The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2011: 35.
21Agamben. The Sacrament of Language: 65.
22Agamben. The Sacrament of Language: 36.
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Wörterbuch etymologically verifies.23 This “twofold form” of the curse 
connects it to homo sacer,24 who is also doubly excluded: from divine law 
since homo sacer may not be sacrificed, and from human law since homo 
sacer may be killed without punishment.25 While we have emphasized 
the institution that guarantees the curse, Agamben literally gives this 
institution a name. From the immanent perspective of the speech act, 
the name of the institution to which the speaker appeals—for example, 
the name of a god—obtains a “double valence.”26 The name is both 
benedictive and maledictive and lends the curse its performative force. 
It accomplishes this through “a suspension of the normal denotative 
character of language.”27
In this way, the pragmatic status of the utterance changes in the 
curse, and with it the situation of the speaking subject changes. This 
is because the speaking subject “puts itself in play as such by linking 
itself performatively to the truth of its own affirmation.”28 Agamben 
only explicitly explains this force of language in the case of the oath. 
As much as it makes sense that the speakers of oaths risk themselves 
due to the potential of perjury, this must certainly be even more true 
of the curse. In this sense, the curse surpasses the oath since the 
curse not only guarantees the truth content of the utterance, but also 
because the curser places himself in relation to a world order. Through 
its normative force, the curse determines the future of the accursed 
and thereby changes the present. In the sacrament of language real-
ized by the curse, the speaking subject is thus always both the subject 
and object of the world order, which brings, to build on Agamben, 
the self-reflectivity of the curse into view. The following investigations 
show that literary works, and particularly Goethe’s dramas, are the 
privileged site for reflecting on the conditions that make the curse 
possible. Goethe stages the curse in literature. By diminishing its force 
or strategically deploying it again and again, such enactments display 
the secularization of the curse in modernity.29 Yet they also show how 
this force remains effective due to the displacement of the institution 
of the curse from the “world” into the subject. There, namely in the 
subject, the curse unleashes its power.30
23Agamben, Giorgio. Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans Daniel Heller- 
Roazan. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988: 81–86.
24Agamben. The Sacrament of Language: 36.
25Agamben. Homo sacer: 81–82.
26Agamben. The Sacrament of Language: 38.
27Agamben. The Sacrament of Language: 55.
28Agamben. The Sacrament of Language: 57.
29Friedrich and Schneider. Einleitung: 9.
30Iphigenie auf Tauris and Faust: Eine Tragödie belong to the works of world literature 
that have produced an enormous amount of secondary literature. In this essay, we only 
refer to the scholarship that deals with the forms and functions of cursing.
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II. Paradigmatic structure: Orest
From a structural perspective, two dramatic plots come together in 
Iphigenie auf Tauris: the plot of Iphigenie and that of Orest. The two 
react to one another like a dialogue between the old and the new 
worlds. On the basis of this epic arrangement, Goethe cannot label 
the drama as a tragedy or a Trauerspiel, and instead simply titles it “Ein 
Schauspiel”—one could also call it a Beobachtungsspiel (that is, instead 
of a “play for looking at,” roughly a spectacle, it is a “play of observa-
tion”). The curse of the House of Atreus and Tantalus—which means 
not just any curse, but rather the “mother of all curses”—serves as the 
fulcrum of observation.31 The great anathema of antiquity, which the 
gods imposed on Tantalus, forces his descendants to become murder-
ers and victims of their own family members. According to Theodor 
W. Adorno, who follows the path of Arthur Henkel’s interpretation, 
the myth constitutes the central issue of the play, which does not 
stage classical humanity, but the dialectic of civilization. The supposed 
Bildungsdrama turns out to be a Zivilisationsdrama.32 In the horizon of 
practical philosophy, the play deals with acknowledgment (Anerken-
nung).33 While Orest is introduced as a primitive character entirely 
subject to this curse and the world order it has established, Iphigenie 
has—“verteufelt human” as she is constructed (Schiller 39.1: 175)34—
freed herself from the curse and its world order. Orest, the accursed 
heteronomous subject, is thus the opposite of Iphigenie, the no longer 
cursed autonomous subject. In this respect, Iphigenie auf Tauris serves 
as propaganda for secularization and qualifies as a central drama of 
nascent modernity. Iphigenie’s “unerhörte Tat” (Goethe, FA 565, line 
377)35 of parrhesia—how she, the beautiful Greek, defies the barbaric 
31Staiger, Emil. Goethe. Vol 1. Zurich: Atlantis, 1952; Reed, Terence James. “Iphigenie 
auf Tauris.” Goethe-Handbuch. Ed. Bernd Witte et al. Vol. 2. Stuttgart: Metzler, 2004: 
195–208, here 195; Mandelartz, Michael. “Die ‘reine Seele’ und die Politik: Partikularität 
und Universalität in Goethes Iphigenie”. Goethe Yearbook 16 (2009): 47–68.
32Adorno, Theodor W. “Zum Klassizismus von Goethes Iphigenie.” Noten zur Literatur. 
Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984: 495–514; Hohendahl, Peter 
Uwe. „A Precarious Balance: Adorno and German Classicism.“ New Literary History: A 
Journal of Theory and Interpretation 42.1 (2011): 31–52; Henkel, Arthur. “Die ‘verteufelt 
humane’ Iphigenie.” Euphorion 59 (1965): 1–17; Henkel, Arthur. “Iphigenie auf Tauris. 
”Das deutsche Drama vom Barock bis zur Gegenwart: Interpretationen. Ed. Benno von Wiese. 
Vol. 1. Düsseldorf: Bagel, 1958: 169–92.
33Erhart, Walter. “Drama der Anerkennung: Neue gesellschaftstheoretische Über-
legungen zu Goethes Iphigenie auf Tauris.” Jahrbuch der Deutschen Schillergesellschaft 51 
(2007): 140–65.
34Schiller, Friedrich. Nationalausgabe. Ed. Julius Petersen and Gerhard Fricke. 43 Vols. 
Weimar: Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1943pp.
35Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Sämtliche Werke: Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche [FA]. 
Ed. Dieter Borchmeyer. Vol. 5. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker-Verlag, 1988.
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Scythian Thoas by speaking the truth36—has been assessed time and 
again as evidence of her autonomy.37
Yet the dramatic form of the play, which epically juxtaposes two 
plots that reciprocally comment and reflect on one another, precludes 
such a trite course of events that would lead from Orest to Iphigenie, 
from heteronomy to autonomy, and from religious magic to Enlighten-
ment reason, from myth to modernity. Goethe worked out this form 
in the three prose versions of the play from 1779, 1780, and 1781.38 
No wonder that in the first performance in Weimar in 1779, Goethe 
himself played the role of Orest. Thus, in a letter to Goethe from 
22 January 1802, Friedrich Schiller—the reader who puts his finger 
on the problem—clairvoyantly proposes the “Orestischen Scenen zu 
verkürzen” (Schiller 31: 92). Although Goethe particularly rewrites the 
entire fourth act when he transposes the play into blank verse in 1787, 
Iphigenie still remains a double drama that negotiates the institutions 
of the curse. But in this negotiation the different sides run askew to 
the characters and form a chiasmus: where we expect the autonomous 
Iphigenie, we find a character solidly anchored in myth; and where we 
see the heteronomous Orest, we discover that the religious institution 
of the curse is actually introjected into the subject.
Religious and secular paths intersect in Iphigenie auf Tauris. As 
Albrecht Koschorke argues, Goethe’s play is most fundamentally about 
the “epistemological problems of human faith in the gods,”39 a faith 
which is also the precondition for the success or failure of the curse. 
In his tragedy Iphigenia in Tauris, Euripides already shows how com-
municative acts that require a religious institution are, by their very 
nature, prone to failure.40 At the end of the play, only a dramaturgi-
36Geisenhanslüke, Achim. “Geständnistiere: Zur Genese der Aufrichtigkeit in Goethes 
Iphigenie auf Tauris.” Iphigenie von Euripides/Goethe: Krieg und Trauma in Nicolas Stemanns 
Doppelinszenierung am Thalia Theater Hamburg. Ed. Ortrud Gutjahr. Würzburg: Königs-
hausen & Neumann, 2008: 89–109.
37Neumann, Gerhard. “‘Reine Menschlichkeit’: Zur Humanisierung des Opfers in 
Goethes Iphigenie.” Humanität in einer pluralistischen Welt? Themengeschichtliche und form-
analytische Studien zur deutschsprachigen Literatur. Ed. Christian Kluwe and Jost Schneider. 
Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2000: 219–36.
38Reinhardt, Hartmut: “Die Geschwister und der König: Zur Psychologie der Figu-
renkonstellation in Goethes Iphigenie auf Tauris.” Johann Wolfgang Goethe. Lyrik und 
Drama. Neue Wege der Forschung. Vol. 1. Ed. Bernd Hamacher and Rüdiger Nutt-Kofoth. 
Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007: 171–88.
39„[…] epistemologische Problematik des menschlichen Götterglaubens.“ Koschorke, 
Albrecht. “Das Politische und die Zeichen der Götter. Zum Lied der Parzen in Iphigenie 
auf Tauris.” Die Gabe des Gedichts. Goethes Lyrik im Wechsel der Töne. Ed. Gerhard Neumann 
and David Wellbery. Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 2008: 143–59, here 155.
40Zimmermann, Bernhard. Spurensuche: Studien zur Rezeption antiker Literatur. Freiburg 
im Breisgau: Rombach, 2009: 91–101.
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cal trick is able to help: Athena saves the institution dea ex machina 
and does so more wrongly than rightly. Koschorke judges Iphigenie’s 
manipulative behavior, which Goethe radicalizes, particularly harshly. 
The entire play is, he argues, a “parable about the usefulness of divine 
manifestations,”41 at the center of which is the hermeneutics of divine 
signs—first of the oracle and, second of the curse. The oracle and 
curse refer to one another since the oracle of Apollo presents Orest 
with the prospect of lifting the curse, but the adventurous plot of 
the double drama is based on “[d]er Götter Worte” always remaining 
“doppelsinnig” (Goethe, FA 572, 613).
The curse of the Tantalids is present in all of the observed commu-
nicative situations. All the characters know the story and refer to the 
myth, which, as a symbolically generalized medium of communication, 
represents a success medium (Erfolgsmedium):42 the myth guarantees 
the improbable success of communication between Iphigenie and 
Thoas, Greek and Scythian, man and woman. In the third scene of 
the first act, Iphigenie, the priestess of Artemis, refers to this cultural 
narrative intending to prevent both further human sacrifices and her 
marriage to Thoas. She thereby uses the content of the “fremder Fluch” 
(Goethe, FA 557 84) without cursing herself. Instead, she especially 
employs expositive utterances (“Ich bin aus Tantalus Geschlecht” (563, 
306); “Ich bin es selbst, bin Iphigenie” (567, 430)). These speech 
acts are characterized as such by a double bind. On the one hand, 
Iphigenie aggrandizes herself above Thoas through the revelation of 
her divine genealogy:
Iphigenie:
[…]
Vernimm! Ich bin aus Tantalus Geschlecht.
Thoas:
Du sprichst ein großes Wort gelassen aus.
Nennst du Den deinen Ahnherrn, den die Welt
Als einen ehmals Hochbegnadigten
Der Götter kennt? Ist’s jener Tantalus,
Den Jupiter zu Rat und Tafel zog,
An dessen alterfahrnen, vielen Sinn
Verknüpfenden Gesprächen Götter selbst,
Wie an Orakelsprüchen, sich ergetzten? (563–564, 306–14)
41„[…] Parabel über die willkürliche Verwendbarkeit von Manifestationen des Gött-
lichen […].“ Koschorke. Das Politische und die Zeichen der Götter: 151.
42Luhmann, Niklas. Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Vol. 1. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1997: 202–05.
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Thoas is not only familiar with Tantalus, he also presents Tantalus as a 
narrator of stories that are analogous to oracles. Tantalus’s ambiguous 
and intricately interwoven stories are as beautiful as oracles. Appar-
ently Iphigenie has inherited from her apical ancestor the rhetorical 
and poetic talent she displays when she tries to deter Thoas with the 
description of a series of increasingly intense atrocities, which culmi-
nate in Atreus’s infanticide and anthropophagy (566, 389). Although 
this friend of good stories turns away for a moment, the humane 
Thoas actually loves Iphigenie with no consideration for her status; 
it is this absolute love that he autonomously places above his faith by 
suspending the human sacrifices for his priestess as long as he wants to:
Iphigenie:
[…]
Ich bin es selbst, bin Iphigenie,
Des Atreus Enkel, Agamemnons Tochter,
Der Göttin Eigentum, die mit dir spricht.
Thoas:
Mehr Vorzug und Vertrauen geb’ ich nicht
Der Königstochter als der Unbekannten.
Ich wiederhole meinen ersten Antrag:
Komm, folge mir und teile was ich habe. (567, 430–36)
While Iphigenie refers to herself as a “Flüchtige” (562, 252) and 
a “verwünschtes Haupt” (562, 268), Thoas simply turns the tables 
by calling the curse a “Segen” (563, 283) and excusing Tantalus: 
“Unedel war er nicht und kein Verräter […] So war / Auch sein 
Vergehen mensch lich […]” (564, 319–22). The performative force 
of the curse has no validity for Thoas; he apparently does not believe 
in the religious institution that lends it power. Thus, the relationship 
between the enlightened Greek and the unenlightened Scythian is also 
upended. The curse does not have any power over Thoas, yet it does 
have the force that language obtains through Iphigenie’s irrational 
feminine desire. For this reason, Thoas shifts, in short, the institution 
from transcendence to immanence: not the gods, but the heart is the 
institution of the curse:
Thoas:
Es spricht kein Gott; es spricht dein eignes Herz.
Iphigenie:
Sie reden nur durch unser Herz zu uns. (568, 493–94)
This shift of the institution of the curse from the gods into language 
(of the heart) depends—from the characters’ perspective—on Thoas’s 
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interpretation, and that means to some extent on his Enlighten-
ment view. He fulfills the paradigm change that leads from myth to 
modernity. Although Iphigenie uses the narrative of the curse as a 
means of rhetorical manipulation, she is, of course, very distant from 
Thoas’s modern position, which would grant her autonomy from 
the gods.43 Her manipulation stops short of the religious institution 
that imposes the curse. To speak of the curse, to employ it for one’s 
own goals, does not entail breaking it. Rhetorical agency alone does 
not lift it. Instead, Iphigenie remains blindly imprisoned in her faith 
and with it in the world order that guarantees the curse. On the one 
hand, “[d]es größten Königes verstoßne Tochter” (556, 41) uses the 
curse to excuse the actions of her father Agamemnon since not he 
but rather an anonymous force (“Sie”) wanted to sacrifice her. On 
the other hand, she attaches herself to the ancestral line of Tantalus. 
Only the goddess Artemis is able to lift the curse, which she has also 
done, and now Iphigenie serves her on Tauris.
Iphigenie:
[…]
Sie lockten mit der Mutter mich in’s Lager;
Sie rissen mich vor den Altar und weihten
Der Göttin dieses Haupt. – Sie war versöhnt;
Sie wollte nicht mein Blut, und hüllte rettend
In eine Wolke mich; in diesem Tempel
Erkannt’ ich mich zuerst vom Tode wieder. (567, 424–29)
In addition to the first scene of the first act, the curse also serves as 
a symbolically generalized medium of communication in the scene 
of anagnorisis between Iphigenie and Orest in the first scene of the 
third act, where it makes communication between Iphigenie and a 
stranger possible. Iphigenie hopes to obtain information about the 
fate of her siblings from this stranger, whom she does not at first 
recognize as her brother:
Iphigenie:
Weh dir, unseliges Mycen!
So haben Tantals Enkel Fluch auf Fluch
Mit vollen wilden Händen ausgesät!
[…]
Wie ist des großen Stammes letzter Sohn,
43Kramer, Olaf. “‘Es spricht kein Gott, es spricht dein eignes Herz’: Kommunikative 
Autonomie und rhetorische Typologie in Goethes Iphigenie.” Jahrbuch Rhetorik 33 (2014): 
114–30, here 127–30.
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Das holde Kind, bestimmt des Vaters Rächer
Dereinst zu sein, wie ist Orest dem Tage
Des Bluts entgangen? Hat ein gleich Geschick
Mit des Avernus Netzen ihn umschlungen?
Ist er gerettet? Lebt er? Lebt Elektra? (583, 967–981)
This communicative act between the siblings is successful since they 
reveal their identities to one another over the course of the scene 
(“Ich bin Orest!” (586, 1082); “Orest, ich bin’s! sieh Iphigenien!” (589, 
1173)). But while the curse is lifted from Iphigenie, it is far from lifted 
from Orest, at least from her perspective, even after this talking cure. 
In the third scene, the priestess of Artemis thus once again calls on 
her gods to ask for her brother’s redemption—that is, in the scene 
immediately after the vision of Hades in which Orest proclaims that 
he has been redeemed:
Iphigenie:
[…]
O laß den einz’gen spätgefundnen mir
Nicht in der Finsternis des Wahnsinns rasen!
Und ist dein Wille, da du hier mich bargst,
Nunmehr vollendet, willst du mir durch ihn
Und ihm durch mich die sel’ge Hülfe geben;
So lös’ ihn von den Banden jenes Fluchs,
Daß nicht die teure Zeit der Rettung schwinde. (593, 1325–31)
The wonder of Orest’s redemption is thus not the result of the talking 
cure; instead, it is solely thanks to the gods, whom she asks to bless him.
Iphigenie:
[…]
O wenn vergoßnen Mutterblutes Stimme
Zur Höll’ hinab mit dumpfen Tönen ruft:
Soll nicht der reinen Schwester Segenswort
Hülfreiche Götter vom Olympus rufen? (588, 1164–67)
Just as Iphigenie is not at all the autonomous subject, she is also not 
at all humane, as becomes clear in the fifth scene of the fourth act, 
which ends with the famous song of the Fates (Parzenlied). Before 
Iphigenie remembers the song, she refers again to the curse of the 
Tantalids, to which all of her family, apart from herself, is still subject:
Iphigenie:
[…]
Soll dieser Fluch denn ewig walten? Soll
Nie dies Geschlecht mit einem neuen Segen
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Sich wieder heben? – Nimmt doch alles ab!
Das beste Glück, des Lebens schönste Kraft
Ermattet endlich! Warum nicht der Fluch? (604, 1694–98)
The only possible means against the curse is the force of her wish 
when she calls upon the Olympians, which again confirms the double 
form of magical speech acts. The speaker of the wish is the subject 
and object of the world order that equally establishes all the types of 
formulaic language: curse, blessing, and wish.
Iphigenie:
[…]
O daß in meinem Busen nicht zuletzt
Ein Widerwillen keime! der Titanen,
Der alten Götter tiefer Haß auf euch,
Olympier, nicht auch die zarte Brust
Mit Geierklauen fasse! Rettet mich,
Und rettet euer Bild in meiner Seele!
Vor meinen Ohren tönt das alte Lied –
Vergessen hatt’ ich’s und vergaß es gern –
Das Lied der Parzen, das sie grausend sangen,
Als Tantalus vom gold’nen Stuhle fiel: (605, 1712–21)
Koschorke emphasizes, on the one hand, the circular structure of this 
wish to possess certainty, which is directed toward divine but unreli-
able addressees.44 On the other hand, he calls attention to the triple 
framing of the song, which opens a paradigmatic series. The Fates sang 
the song to an old exiled man, as the song itself mentions in its sixth 
stanza. And Iphigenie knows of the song from her nurse, who used 
to sing it to Iphigenie and her siblings (1724–25); and now Iphigenie 
sings it, and sings of its previous performances, in a traumatic situation. 
Neither the Fates nor the nurse qualify, however, as reliable narrators. 
The declamation therefore emerges as a regression.45 That may well 
be true—in any case, Iphigenie functions as a structural substitute for 
both the wet nurse and the Fates, which is indicated when she joins 
the row of singers, forming a mythological paradigm.
Precisely because the song is composed, moreover, of logical and 
topological reflections, making it a microdouble of the communica-
tive situation observed throughout Iphigenie auf Tauris, it does not lead 
Iphigenie to autonomy. “The decision for autonomy can only be made 
in an eccentric position, in the opening to the Other and in proximity 
44Koschorke. Das Politische und die Zeichen der Götter: 155.
45Koschorke. Das Politische und die Zeichen der Götter: 156.
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to the Other—that is, where the decision loses the character of self-
certainty.”46 This decision not only concerns Iphigenie but also Orest. 
That Iphigenie auf Tauris is a secretive Oresteia is apparent even in the 
structure of the play. Orest is, in fact, the only character who develops 
over the course of the play, while Iphigenie remains as wise or unwise 
as she was at the beginning. The moment when Orest’s heteronomy 
turns into autonomy constitutes the climax of the third act, in which 
Goethe subjectivizes the curse of the Tantalids in the case of Orest.
In the meeting of the two siblings, which was analyzed from Iphi-
genie’s perspective as a scene of anagnorisis, the melancholic Orest 
imagines the enforcers of the curse (590, 1228–32),47 who remain 
invisible to everyone else. Like Euripides before him, Goethe psycho-
logically interprets Orest’s mythological consciousness. “[D]ie Ursache 
seines Zustands,” writes Friedrich Schiller to Goethe on 22 January 
1802, lies “bloß im Gemüth” (Schiller 31: 92). For Orest takes “das Amt 
der Furien auf [s]ich” (Goethe, FA 757), and thus introjects the curse 
so that the persecution of Orest merely has to do with intrapsychic 
“Zweifel” and “Reue” (585, 1061). In the confrontation with his sister, 
he constructs a series of names that closely connects Iphigenie with 
both Clytemnestra and the enforcers of the curse. In the verse version 
he says, “O laß dein Fragen und geselle dich / Nicht auch zu den 
Erinnyen” (588, 1148–49), while the prose version is even clearer: “Es 
ruft! Es ruft! So willst du mein Verderben! Hat eine Rachegottheit sich 
in dich verkleidet?” (175). Orest’s melancholy is thus revealed to be a 
self-destructive narcissism:48 in the repetition of experience, Orest has 
the “Eindruck eines [ihn] verfolgenden Schicksals, eines dämonischen 
Zuges in [seinem] Erleben,”49 as Sigmund Freud explains such experi-
ences in Jenseits des Lustprinzips—they become a “Schicksalszwang.”50
Throughout the play, many attributions relate Iphigenie to Artemis;51 
as the priestess of Artemis, Iphigenie is to sacrifice Orest according 
46“Die Entscheidung zur Autonomie kann nur in einer exzentrischen Position, in 
der Öffnung auf das Andere und in der Nähe des Anderen fallen, – also gerade dort, 
wo sie den Charakter der Selbstgewißheit verliert.“ Koschorke. Das Politische und die 
Zeichen der Götter: 158.
47Ekelund, Lena and Stefan Hermes. “Gerettete Königskinder: Orest, der Wahn und 
die Schwester(n) bei Goethe und Euripides.” Iphigenie von Euripides/Goethe: 113–26.
48Geisenhanslüke, Achim. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Iphigenie auf Tauris: Interpretation. 
Munich: Oldenbourg, 1997: 45.
49Freud, Sigmund. Gesammelte Werke. Ed. Anna Freud et al. Vol. 13. Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer, 1999: 20.
50Freud. Gesammelte Werke. Vol. 13: 22.
51Reed. Iphigenie auf Tauris: 195.
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to Taurian custom, which would make her an enforcer of the curse. 
The Furies (Erinnyen), Artemis, and Iphigenie thus form a second 
mythological paradigm. Goethe may have known that Iphigeneía is a 
particular instantiation of the Aegean great goddess, who was con-
sidered to be both the priestess and the epiclesis of the chthonic, 
maternal Artemis according to the relevant entry in Benjamin Hed-
erich’s Gründlichem mythologischen Lexikon from 1770.52 Karl Kerényi 
notes, moreover, that in Greek mythology, Iphigeneía is an epithet or 
even a substitute of Artemis.53 Thus, an association between Iphigenie 
and Artemis has a cultural basis. Orest’s persecution thus climaxes in 
the so-called vision of Hades in the second scene of the third act. It 
is the climax because in this vision, as Emil Staiger has pointed out, 
Goethe assigns a place and genealogy to the destructive forces that 
he has installed in the ego.
Orest:
[…]
Mit Fluch beladen stieg er herab.
Doch leichter träget sich hier jede Bürde:
Nehmt ihn, o nehmt ihn in euern Kreis! – (592, 1284–86)
Yet, like Iphigenie, Orest has had from the beginning an Enlighten-
ment counterpart at his side, who questions the religious institution 
of the curse and copes with the old world order humanely. In the 
first scene of the second act, Pylades comments on the curse of the 
Tantalids: the son “erbt der Eltern Segen, nicht ihr Fluch” (575, 717). 
Orest’s redemption from the curse, which “simply” happens after he 
faints, is motivated by rationalization and psychologization.54 For, on 
the stage of the subject, the curse does not have to be lifted; instead it 
can be “geheilt” (600, 1536 and 602, 1607), as Freud diagnoses in his 
Ansprache im Frankfurter Goethe-Haus: “In seiner vielleicht erhabensten 
Dichtung, der Iphigenie, zeigt uns Goethe ein ergreifendes Beispiel 
einer Entsühnung, einer Befreiung der leidenden Seele von dem 
Druck der Schuld, und er läßt diese Katharsis sich vollziehen durch 
einen leidenschaftlichen Gefühlsausbruch unter dem wohltätigen 
Einfluß einer liebevollen Teilnahme.”55 Indeed, the institution of the 
heart thus replaces that of the gods, which is already anticipated in 
52Hederich, Benjamin. Gründliches mythologisches Lexicon. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1996: 1363–66.
53Kerényi, Karl. Die Mythologie der Griechen. Vol. 2. Die Heroengeschichten. Munich: DTV, 
1966: 258.
54Staiger. Goethe: 360–62.
55Freud. Gesammelte Werke . Vol. 14: 548; Port, Ulrich. Pathosformeln: Die Tragödie und 
die Geschichte exaltierter Affekte (1755–1886). München: Fink, 2005: 139–41.
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the figure of Thoas. By splitting Orest into an ego and the intrapsy-
chic agent of the heart, which speaks to him and makes him speak, 
Goethe completes the subjectivization of the curse:
Orest:
[…]
Laß mich zum erstenmal mit freiem Herzen
In deinen Armen reine Freude haben!
[…]
Es löset sich der Fluch, mir sagt’s das Herz.
Die Eumeniden ziehn, ich höre sie,
Zum Tartarus und schlagen hinter sich
Die ehrnen Tore fernabdonnernd zu.
Die Erde dampft erquickenden Geruch
Und ladet mich auf ihren Flächen ein,
Nach Lebensfreud’ und großer Tat zu jagen. (594, 1343–64; our 
emphasis)
Rasch, for good reasons, votes for Orest’s autonomy.56 In contrast to 
Iphigenie, who counts herself among the accursed—just as she is, 
inversely, included in the mythological enforcers of the curse—the 
no longer cursed Orest now reclaims the rhetorical agency that gives 
the curse its power by cursing himself. He is thus both the object and 
medium of the curse. He is the force that he addresses in the apos-
trophe below when he curses his “Leib” and with it the “Barbaren.” 
Autonomy thus becomes manifest in the immanent force of language 
to curse, which presupposes a splitting of the self into a cursing and 
a cursed ego. Consequently, with his “Leib,” Orest makes himself the 
authoritative medium of the curse:
Orest:
[…]
Es stürze mein entseelter Leib vom Fels,
Es rauche bis zum Meer’ hinab mein Blut,
Und bringe Fluch dem Ufer der Barbaren! (586, 1089–91)
Orest’s rhetorical agency culminates in the question of interpretive 
sovereignty with regard to the curse of the Tantalids. It is well known 
that Goethe outdoes and fulfills the Euripidean tragedy by making the 
religious institution only become tangible in belated acts of interpreta-
tion. The interpretation of the oracle in the sixth scene of the fifth 
act makes the disempowerment of the gods possible and also marks 
56Rasch, Wolfdietrich. Goethes ‘Iphigenie auf Tauris’ als Drama der Autonomie. Munich: 
Beck, 1979: 119.
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the switch from heteronomy to autonomy, from myth to modernity, 
in which there are no longer any “Götter und Geister” (Schiller 31: 
92). With a “hermeneutic ‘coup,’” Orest manipulates the King of 
the Taurians,57 allowing the Greeks to leave the island unharmed. 
The truth of the matter, however, is that Orest does not manipulate 
Thoas, but rather convinces him of the correct meaning of the oracle. 
The basis is a “normal” disambiguation of the oracle, meaning that 
it contextualizes the oracle and presents itself as a correctio, a verdic-
tive speech act. Accused by Thoas of looting cultural artifacts, Orest 
enlightens the enlightened prosecutor: “Das Bild, o König, soll uns 
nicht entzweien!” (Goethe, FA 617, 2107). The entire affair was an 
“Irrtum” (617, 2108), for which the ambiguous oracle is responsible:
Orest:
[…]
Um Rat und um Befreiung bat ich ihn
Von dem Geleit der Furien; er sprach:
“Bringst du die Schwester, die an Tauris Ufer
Im Heiligtume wider Willen bleibt,
Nach Griechenland; so löset sich der Fluch.” (617, 2111–15)
Due to the vagueness of the determinate articles, the oracle’s utterance 
can have two meanings depending on the situational context: “die 
Schwester” can refer to either the statue or Iphigenie. In this sense, 
Orest explains to Thoas: “Wir legten’s von Apollens Schwester aus” 
(617, 2116); that is, they both interpreted Apollo’s sister to be the 
referent of “Schwester” in the oracle. But Apollo could have actually 
meant Iphigenie with “die Schwester”—and not the “Bild” of his own 
sister, the goddess Artemis. Thoas is convinced by this disambiguation: 
the cultic statue remains on Crimea and the Greeks are able to leave 
with the sister—“Lebt wohl!” (619, 2174). Although Orest proceeds 
rhetorically, he does not manipulate Thoas, but rather convinces 
him. He can convince him because both communicate outside of the 
world order that is established by the curse of the Tantalids; because 
they both face one another—to put it trenchantly—as moderns. This 
reading resolves the much-discussed lack of motivation for the play’s 
conclusion. Why should two rational men not be in the position to 
arrive at an understanding? From this perspective, Thoas is the model 
of an Enlightenment politician.58 Yet this interpretation of the oracle 
is again turned on its head when Orest addresses Iphigenie after the 
correctio in a narratio that restores the oracle’s ambiguity:
57Koschorke. Das Politische und die Zeichen der Götter: 153.
58Rasch. Goethes ‘Iphigenie auf Tauris’ als Drama der Autonomie: 99–116.
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Orest:
[…] Gleich einem heil’gen Bilde,
Daran der Stadt unwandelbar Geschick
Durch ein geheimes Götterwort gebannt ist,
Nahm sie dich weg, dich Schützerin des Hauses;
Bewahrte dich in einer heil’gen Stille
Zum Segen deines Bruders und der Deinen. (618, 2127–34)
First, by comparing Iphigenie with the divine image and, second, by 
placing the image in the temple of Artemis, Orest makes his sister into 
a cultic statue in personam. The verbs wegnehmen and bewahren suggest 
that the direct object is a possession. They do not normally take living 
beings—and especially not humans—as their objects, so the statement 
presupposes the objectification of Iphigenie. Orest thus plans to do 
the exact same with the cultic statue as Artemis did with Iphigenie 
when Agamemnon was about to sacrifice her: he plans to remove it 
from one place and store it in another. Orest’s sister and Apollo’s 
sister are thus interchangeable variables of one and the same action. 
In this way, Orest constructs a third mythological paradigm, making 
his and Apollo’s sister substitutable at one and the same syntagmatic 
place of the oracle.
With regard to the ambiguity of the oracle, this means that Orest 
actually brings Artemis to Greece by bringing his sister with him. Con-
sequently, Iphigenie remains imprisoned in the world order in which 
the gods reign. At the end of the play, Iphigenie also literally speaks 
a different language than Orest and Thoas. And the understanding 
between the two does not inspire any alternative faith in her; instead, 
she demands that Thoas bless the departure of the siblings. Iphigenie 
thus connects the curse with its direct opposite. Both the curse and 
the blesssing presuppose the same institution that Iphigenie believes 
in and embodies as the substitute of the goddess: “Nicht so, mein 
König! Ohne Segen, / In Widerwillen, scheid’ ich nicht von dir” 
(618, 2152–53).
Moreover, the interpretation of the oracle constitutes the fulcrum 
that interconnects the two plots of this Beobachtungsspiel, the Iphig-
enie plot and the Orest plot. The relay of this interconnection is, in 
Goethe’s Oresteia, the character of Orest. The chthonic, maternal 
imago of Artemis-Iphigenie depends on the perspectival consciousness 
of his character. Since this is the case, the interpretation of the oracle 
as a moment of “redemption” after the vision of Hades is, of course, 
more than questionable: such a mother-sister can recover her power 
at any time and turn against the ego in the Hades of the unconscious 
with all possible power and archaic cruelty. By psychologizing the 
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curse, Goethe shifts its structure of repetition into the masculine, 
narcissistic subject, and concludes his “Schauspiel” with an epically 
elegant open end.
III. Syntagmatic variations: Faust and Manfred
“Welch ein verfluchtes Abenteuer!” (Goethe, Faust 453, line 11783).59 
With this curse Mephisto sums up the dramatic plot of Goethe’s Faust 
at the conclusion of the second part when Faust’s soul is snatched 
away from him. In this paper we take Mephisto seriously and consider 
how Faust’s journey through the great and small world truly is under 
a curse. Up through the most recent scholarship, Faust’s curse in the 
second Studierzimmer scene has been interpreted as a mere sign of his 
despair following his failed suicide attempt.60 But the significance of 
the curse is much greater than that. Faust may not be under a curse, 
but he does become a cursing subject who levels the triadic structure 
of curses and ceases to recognize any institution of the curse beyond 
the subject. Cursing is thereby on its way to being institutionalized 
within the subject, though admittedly before this institution becomes 
psychologized. One searches in vain for the psychological parts of the 
self in Faust’s curse, but not for the traditional canon of values and 
its authorities. Taking this radical curse seriously as a performative 
speech act means placing it in a series with two other speech acts: 
the wager and the pact. The wager between the Lord and Mephisto 
in the Prolog im Himmel establishes the conditions for both Faust’s 
curse in particular and the entire dramatic plot more generally. The 
wager refers, as is well known, to the Book of Job,61 but it intensifies 
the configuration from the Old Testament. In Goethe, Faust has a 
double function: he is both the object and stakes of the wager. As 
an exercitive speech act, every wager is a contract that establishes a 
course of action based upon an extra stipulation.62 The speaker only 
commits himself to the course of action if this stipulation is met. By 
accepting the wager, the addressee usually commits to a reciprocal 
course of action if the stipulation is not met. The wager is valid after 
59Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Faust. Ed. Albrecht Schöne. Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 
2003.
60Krings, Marcel. “‘Du hast sie zerstört, die schöne Welt’: Antimoderne und Idea-
lismuskritik in Goethes Faust I.” Goethes Faust I‘ zwischen Tradition und Modernität. Ed. 
Philippe Wellnitz. Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010: 111–32; 
Schmidt, Jochen. Goethes Faust. Erster und Zweiter Teil. Grundlagen – Werk – Wirkung. 
Munich: Beck, 1999: 95–108.
61Schrader, Hans-Jürgen. “Modell des Menschen: Hiob im Goetheschen Faust.” Col-
loquium Helveticum 34 (2003): 159–91.
62Austin. How to do things with Words: 155–157.
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the exchange of the declarations of intent. Both partners of the wager 
thus commit to a course of action, but only one will have to fulfill it 
in the end. In the Prolog im Himmel, Faust appears at two points in 
the exercitive speech act of the wager, with which the Lord commits 
himself—of course not without a much-discussed little loophole63—
to a course of action. Faust is the stakes, which the Lord has at his 
disposal, and he is also the stipulation that determines which of the 
two will win the bet. The wager of the Prolog thus has an asterisk not 
only because it is made between seemingly asymmetric parties, but 
also because the logic of speech-act theory shifts the focus to Faust.
A curse encroaches on the constellation of the wager due to the 
all-too-obvious allusions to Job. The biblical Satan will win the Old 
Testament wager if Job renounces God with a curse (Job 1:11),64 which 
God declares to be impossible. Even when Job later curses the day of 
his birth (Job 3:3–10), and thus at least indirectly condemns God as 
his creator, his wife cannot convince him to curse God and die (Job 
2:9).65 In contrast, Faust curses extensively and, in one sweeping blow, 
he not only imprecates the day of his birth but also all of creation.66 
With the curse, the character of Faust asserts himself and breaks free 
from the framework of the Prolog’s heavenly wager, though he con-
tinues to refer to it all the same:
Faust:
Wenn aus dem schrecklichen Gewühle
Ein süß bekannter Ton mich zog,
Den Rest von kindlichem Gefühle
Mit Anklang froher Zeit betrog:
So fluch’ ich allem was die Seele
Mit Lock- und Gaukelwerk umspannt,
Und sie in diese Trauerhöhle
63On the preconditions of the wager, and especially on verses 315–17, see Arens, 
Hans. Kommentar zu Goethes Faust I. Heidelberg: Winter, 1982: 49.
64The King James Version translates this explicitly as a “curse,” while the Luther edi-
tion (Basel 1772) used by Goethe and consulted by Albrecht Schöne in his commentary 
renders it as follows: “er wird dich ins angesicht segnen? <ironisch im gegenteiligen 
Sinne gemeint.” Schöne, Albrecht. Kommentare: Goethe Faust. Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 
2003: 171.
65Vette, Joachim: “Hiobs Fluch als thematische Klammer.” Das Buch Hiob und seine 
Interpretationen: Beiträge zum Hiob-Symposium auf dem Monte Verità vom 14.–19. August 2005. 
Ed. Thomas Krüger et al. Zurich: Theologischer Verlag, 2007: 231–39, here 237–38. 
On the differences between the curse in the Book of Job and Faust’s imprecation of 
creation, see Dumont, Altrud. “Faust – ein Urenkel Hiobs? Zum Verhältnis von Trans-
formation und Abstoßung.” Kreuzwege: Transformationen des Mythischen in der Literatur. 
Ed. Dietmar Jacobsen. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1999: 123–44, here 124–28.
66Schings, Hans-Jürgen. “Faust und der dritte Schöpfungstag.” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift 
für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 88 (2014): 439–67, here 463.
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Mit Blend- und Schmeichelkräften bannt!
Verflucht voraus die hohe Meinung,
Womit der Geist sich selbst umfängt!
Verflucht das Blenden der Erscheinung,
Die sich an unsre Sinne drängt!
Verflucht was uns in Träumen heuchelt,
Des Ruhms, der Namensdauer Trug!
Verflucht was als Besitz uns schmeichelt,
Als Weib und Kind, als Knecht und Pflug!
Verflucht sei Mammon, wenn mit Schätzen
Er uns zu kühnen Taten regt,
Wenn er zu müßigem Ergetzen
Die Polster uns zurechte legt!
Fluch sei dem Balsamsaft der Trauben!
Fluch jener höchsten Liebeshuld!
Fluch sei der Hoffnung! Fluch dem Glauben,
Und Fluch vor allen der Geduld! (Goethe, Faust 73, 1583–1606)
The form of this all-in-one curse can be quickly described. It consists 
of twenty-four verses that can be divided into three semantic units, 
each containing eight verses. Each verse has four stressed syllables and 
begins with an anacrusis; the cross rhyme alternates strictly so that 
every other verse ends hypercatalectically with an unstressed syllable, 
followed by the unstressed first syllable of the next verse. Thus, of all 
stanzaic forms, Faust curses in the most common form of the German 
Enlightenment, which, furthermore, goes back to the sixteenth-century 
hymn (Kirchenlied).67 Goethe’s Faust most prominently uses the same 
stanzaic form in the Prolog im Himmel, where the Archangels glorify the 
Lord by praising creation. With this intratextual reference, the praise 
and destruction of God’s creation are shown to be directly related to 
one another on a formal level, and they refer, moreover, to the actual 
object of the wager: as the object of the wager, Faust should substitute 
for creation in its entirety, but he is also simultaneously the prize that 
Mephisto will receive if he successfully perverts the praise of creation 
through the seduction of Faust. In Faust’s curse there is an unmistak-
able, though not at all metrically supported, element of acceleration, 
amplification, and intensification,68 leading Albrecht Schöne to call it 
67Frank, Horst Joachim. Handbuch der deutschen Strophenformen. Tübingen and Basel: 
Francke, 1993: 649–53.
68Significantly, these elements are also present in the Archangels’ praise of creation, 
especially in the dialogue of Gabriel and Michael. See Anderegg, Johannes: “Schöp-
fungslob und Himmelfahrt: Goethes ‘Faust’ und die Geschichte Hiobs.” Jahrbuch des 
Freien deutschen Hochstifts. Ed. Anne Bohnenkamp. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2007: 171–97, 
here 175–77.
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a “curse avalanche” due to both its rhythm and content.69 With ever 
greater haste and, at the end, maximally condensed with anaphoras, 
Faust imprecates a canon of values that at first appears to be assembled 
quite arbitrarily; but a closer reading reveals a logic that first relates 
back to the wager from the Prolog im Himmel, and, second, becomes 
binding for the further course of the plot: the pact-wager of the 
Studierzimmer and the end of the play.
The curse is linked to Faust’s preceding failed suicide attempt, 
and, with an ambiguous conjunction, it substitutes for the suicide as 
another form of sacrilege, though through words instead of actions 
(444, 11409). The ambiguity is displayed in the conjunction wenn, 
which can either be read as a concessive conjunction in the sense 
of although or as a causal conjunction in the sense of because. This 
ambiguity is structurally definitive for the curse because it triggers 
the polarity of the cursed objects. The text accordingly begins with 
an announcement before it enumerates the actual objects of the 
curse: everything that the soul associates with a reality discredited as 
a “Trauerhöhle”—that is, all the subjective connections between the 
I and the world—becomes the object of the curse that follows. The 
curse is thus a radical negation of the world and therefore, in the 
context of the Prolog im Himmel, of creation. The second part then 
juxtaposes oppositions according to the law of polarity: the spirit and 
senses are just as accursed as immaterial dreams and material posses-
sions. Finally, in the first four verses of the third part, Faust imprecates 
money in the form of Mammon, which—in contrast to the possessions 
of the preceding semantic unit—is, in itself, ambivalent and therefore 
occupies the most space in Faust’s curse. Mammon represents, as 
Adelung’s dictionary informs us,70 not only legendary wealth but also 
an insatiable desire that instigates both bold deeds and idle delight. 
This refers most directly to the tragedy’s sequel where Faust enters 
in the first act as Plutus, the god of wealth (234, 5569). But before 
it can come to that, Faust must first execrate wine as a religious bal-
sam and then curse the Christian cardinal virtues—love, hope, and 
faith—in reverse order to the First Epistle to the Corinthians (1. Cor. 
13:13). The end of this fatal cascade is formed by “Geduld,” which, 
on the one hand, recalls the First Epistle to the Thessalonians with its 
formulation “patience of hope” (1. Thess. 1:3). On the other hand, 
“Geduld” functions as the motor of Faust’s striving (Streben) and so 
69Schöne. Kommentare: 256.
70Adelung, Johann Christoph. Grammatisch-kritisches Wörterbuch der Hochdeutschen 
Mundart. Vol. 2. Leipzig, 1796: 42–43.
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can be understood as the opposite of acedia (the indolence of the 
heart),71 from which he suffers and so imprecates here particularly 
sharply.72 Faust certainly does not exclude himself from this cascade of 
curses and with “Geduld” he also imprecates the putative prototypical 
attribute of Job.73 Consequently, Faust is not hunted by the Furies or 
by religious institutions, but rather only by himself; the curse has its 
roots within the subject.
It is for this reason that Faust does not need an authority, and 
definitely not a god, who would guarantee his curse. He does not 
apostrophize any power that would substantiate the curse other than 
himself. This goes so far that Faust switches in the middle of the 
curse from the first-person singular into the first-person plural and 
universalizes his experience. Furthermore, the curse is the systematic 
destruction of meaning that would be guaranteed by a third authority. 
Thus, with this curse as a negative confession, Faust not only destroys 
the Christian canon of values; he also sets himself as a subject so 
radically that the fulfillment of the curse is only substantiated by the 
subject itself. The imprecation of creation thereby becomes a curse 
of subjectivity, which does not exclude the subject itself. Subjectivity is 
both the object and subject of the curse: that is, it grounds the curse 
and is cursed (both by the very constraints that define the curse in 
the original wager from the Prolog im Himmel and in the curse itself). 
Within this structure, Faust destroys the “schöne Welt,” as the invis-
ible choir of spirits laments directly after the curse (Goethe, Faust 
73, 1609).74 But Faust’s curse does not bring forth the destruction of 
the world without also demanding that it be rebuilt, a demand for a 
“Neuen Lebenslauf” (74, 1622). In this way, the curse sets the stage for 
the devil’s pact that follows it. Since it applies above all to the “Seele” 
(73, 1587), it is, in its radical negation, not only a substitute for the 
suicide attempt, it also specifically refers to the double function of 
Faust in the wager between Mephisto and the Lord, where Faust’s 
soul represents Mephisto’s ultimate prize.
Faust’s curse does not at all indicate, however, that Mephisto has 
won the bet, as the reference to Job could suggest. On the contrary, 
71Wulf, F. “Trägheit.” Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. Ed. Josef Höfer and Karl Rahner. 
Vol. 10. Freiburg: Herder, 1965: 302–03.
72Schings. Faust und der dritte Schöpfungstag: 464; Wellbery, David E. Reflexion 
tragischer Form in Goethes ‘Faust.’ Talk at the Goethe-Nationalmuseum (Weimar) during 
his Meisterkurs “Goethes Poetik der Form.” 25 August 2015.
73Laan, J. M. van der. Seeking Meaning for Goethe’s Faust. London and New York: Con-
tinuum, 2007: 38–44.
74On the musical elements, see Hartmann, Tina. Goethes Musiktheater: Singspiele, Opern, 
Festspiele, ‘Faust.’ Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2004, 367–68; Schmidt. Goethes Faust: 139.
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the curse is the starting point for Faust’s journey through the great 
and small world of the drama. A further speech act is required prior 
to the journey—namely, the pact, which is no less beset with stipula-
tions and yet still depends on the curse. It is only after the destruc-
tion of the world with all its semantic relations that Faust becomes, 
as Jochen Schmidt notes, “ripe for the devil.”75 Mephisto notices this 
immediately and offers the appropriate contract (75, 1656–59). Yet 
Faust still cannot be so easily persuaded to sign the devil’s pact. He is 
skeptical of whether Mephisto has anything at all to offer and is only 
convinced of the pact by the paradoxical “Schätzen” (76, 1689) and 
the offer of “was Gut’s in Ruhe [zu] schmausen” (76, 1691). Precisely 
this last point is especially decisive because Faust uses it to turn the 
pact into a wager. Mephisto is required to realize one aspect of his 
catalogue of obligations as the condition upon which Faust will have 
to fulfill his side of the pact. This doubling within the second wager 
thus mirrors the double function of Faust in the first wager from the 
Prolog, where he is simultaneously the prize and the object. Faust’s inner 
state of mind, manifest in the famous speech act “Verweile doch! du 
bist so schön!” (76, 1700), is also the criterion for Mephisto to win the 
wager. This speech act, which delivers Faust’s soul to the devil, is the 
flipside of the curse, and it rescinds its own radical negation of the 
curse by taking up accursed Geduld and expressing a self-sufficiency 
that was unthinkable after the curse (76, 1695). In the structure of the 
curse, the “Verweile doch!” thus has the function of a blessing, albeit 
inverted, which terminates the “Taumel” (78, 1766) of the journey 
through the world and signals the end of the subjectivity guaranteed 
in the curse. This curse of subjectivity reveals itself in the path of 
destruction that Faust leaves everywhere behind him on his journey 
through the world; it is, however, also condition of the curse. The 
curse consequently has already changed Faust even before the pact-
wager with Mephisto: from a melancholic and suicidal scholar into an 
almost nihilistic subject. Nevertheless, the curse is not at all a sign of 
powerlessness;76 it is, rather, the powerful positing of the subject. In 
contrast, Mephisto remains merely “hiobsartig” (453, 11809) at the 
end when he imprecates the choir of angels (453, 11816) when it 
abducts the wager’s prize: Faust’s soul. For after the “Verweile doch” 
(446, 11582), the Lord seemingly intervenes again into the plot in the 
figure of the choir and derives redemption from the curse of Streben.
75Schmidt. Goethes Faust: 106.
76Brüning, Gerrit. “Die Wette in Goethes Faust.” Goethe Yearbook 17 (2010): 31–54, here 
40. On the difference between the power and powerlessness of curses, see Dorschel. 
Entwurf einer Theorie des Fluchens: 174.
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In comparison to Faust: Eine Tragödie, Goethe’s partial translation 
of Lord Byron’s dramatic poem Manfred clearly intensifies the curse 
of subjectivity by psychologizing the institution of the curse. As is well 
known, Lord Byron’s texts exercised great influence on Goethe;77 the 
Goethe-Handbuch even groups Byron with Herder and Schiller as the 
three contemporaries that were most significant to his work.78 Goethe’s 
selective translation of Manfred evidences, moreover, a reciprocal influ-
ence between the two.79 In the translation, Goethe reacts to Byron’s 
Manfred, which is itself a radicalization of the epistemological aporias 
from Faust (Goethe, MA 11.2: 293–96).80 In addition to the first twelve 
verses of the drama, a central monologue of the protagonist, and an 
excerpt from the fourth scene of the second act, Goethe most promi-
nently translates the curse that concludes the first scene of the first act. 
This curse is spoken by an abstract voice after Manfred summons—as 
a disproportionately successful revenant of Faust—a whole seven spirits 
and all the elements. At the same time, Manfred is already explicitly 
under a curse before the incantation:
Manfred:
[…]
Since that all-nameless hour. I have no dread,
And feel the curse to have no natural fear,
Nor fluttering throb, that beats with hopes or wishes,
Or lurking love of something on the earth.–– (Byron 53–54, lines 24–27)81
This curse is not tied to any authority beyond the subject, who, signifi-
cantly, also “feel[s] the curse” of, paradoxically, not feeling anything: 
it is thus a curse of apathy that leaves only the curse itself to be felt. 
Consequently, the hour of malediction does not have a name, is “all-
77Hewitt, Ben. Byron, Shelley, and Goethe’s Faust: An Epic Connection. London: Legenda, 
2015.
78Boyle, Nicholas. “Byron, George Gordon Noel, Lord.” Goethe-Handbuch. Vol. 4.1: 
145–49, here 148.
79In particular, Evi Zemanek has recently examined Goethe’s translations from Man-
fred, but she does not investigate the curse in Faust: Eine Tragödie. See Zemanek, Evi. 
“‘Falsche Spiegelung’? Spekulation, Projektion, Identifikation. Goethes Übertragungen 
aus Byrons Manfred und Don Juan im Zeichen einer Re-Formierung des tragischen 
Helden.” Annäherung – Anverwandlung – Aneignung: Goethes Übersetzungen in poetologischer 
und interkultureller Perspektive. Ed. Markus May. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 
2013: 163–86.
80Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Sämtliche Werke nach Epochen seines Schaffens: Münchner 
Ausgabe [MA]. Ed. Karl Richter. 21 Vols. Munich: Hanser, 1998; Jackson, Emila A. 
Bernhard. “Manfred’s Mental Theater and the Construction of Knowledge.” Studies 
in English Literature, 1500–1900 47.4 (2007): 799–824, here 800–801; Wesche, Ulrich. 
“Goethe’s Faust and Byron’s Manfred: The Curious Transformation of a Motif.” Revue 
de Littérature Comparée 50 (1976): 286–90.
81Byron, George Gordon. The Complete Poetical Works. Ed. Jerome J. McGann. Vol. 4. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
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nameless,” and thereby also evades the subject. The subsequent sum-
moning of spirits is not only a reaction to this curse, but also needs 
the curse: “By the strong curse which is upon my soul” (54, 47). It is 
only now, in the third attempt, that the summoning of the powerful 
spirits works, but it does not serve its purpose of freeing Manfred 
from the curse. He pleads for “Forgetfulness” (57, 136), “Oblivion, 
self-oblivion” (58, 144), but the spirits cannot offer that because they 
are immortal and eternal, and, for that reason, are not conscious of 
time. Spirits neither die nor forget. Before he subsequently breaks 
off the incantation, Manfred demands to see the spirits in their own 
true forms. But these forms do not exist; the spirits are only formless 
elements. The seventh spirit, the spirit of fate, appears to him as a 
beautiful female figure, presumably his dead beloved. But when he 
tries to embrace it, he falls to the ground unconscious and becomes 
the object of the subsequent curse.
In Goethe’s translation, this curse has a distinctly different form 
than in the original. Goethe adjusts two aspects. First, he frames the 
passage differently, and, second, he noticeably intensifies the dramatic 
climax in the sixth stanza. For the seven stanzas are actually not at 
all about a curse. While a paratext in the English original refers to 
the passage as an “incantation,” thus suggesting connections to the 
conjuration scene in Faust,82 Goethe titles the passage “Bannfluch” 
and thus shifts its meaning: it is no longer about an incantation, but 
rather about a curse that expels its object from a—usually religious, 
but here moral—community.83 This significantly changes the inter-
pretation of the framed verses.
But before we can take a closer look at this change, we must analyze 
the framed verses. For Goethe’s translation focuses on two things with 
respect to form. First, it attempts to preserve the metrical structure of 
the original as much as possible. Goethe’s translation is accordingly 
composed of seven acephalous ten-verse stanzas that string together 
four stressed syllables and end stressed or unstressed with irregular 
cadences. Second, Goethe tries to maintain the semantics of the ends 
of verses by leaving most of the words that are at the end of a verse 
in the original in the same position in his translation. In doing so, 
problems arise with syntax and rhyme. While the syntax is adapted 
accordingly, Goethe abandons the end rhymes; he does not employ 
the rhyme pattern of the original. Moreover, he deviates from Byron’s 
meter at a crucial point: in the sixth stanza—the undisputable climax 
82Zemanek. “Falsche Spiegelung“: 170.
83Grimm and Grimm. Deutsches Wörterbuch. Vol. 1: 1114.
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of the curse84—Goethe breaks with the meter of the original in every 
single verse. Why this emphasis on the sixth stanza?
To answer this question, we must briefly investigate the function of 
the curse, or rather the “incantation.” As already mentioned, Manfred 
pleads for forgetting, specifically self-forgetting, in the great summon-
ing of the introductory scene. He omits, however, the object of this 
forgetting; it is inexpressible: “Ye know it, and I cannot utter it” (58, 
138), he says to the summoned spirit when asked for his desires. In the 
curse, and this is our thesis, the psychological parts of the self return 
as a curse of memory, from which Manfred cannot free himself, but 
whose content he also cannot express consciously. For Manfred is not 
primarily damned for his deeds, but rather above all for the psychologi-
cal parts of his self, as the fifth stanza makes explicit: his false tears, 
the blackest blood of his heart, and his poisonous smile—the worst 
poison that comes from Manfred’s lips. Those are the means used in 
Manfred’s curse that turn against him. This structure is intensified in 
the sixth stanza, where Manfred’s characteristics directly become the 
object of the appeal and replace a third power—in addition to the 
curser and the accursed—in the apostrophic structure of the curse. 
The appeals culminate in the highest form of the curse, which again 
depends on an incantation as demonstrated in the sixth stanza:
Bei Deiner kalten Brust, dem Schlangenlächeln,  By thy cold breast and serpent 
smile,
Der Arglist unergründlichem Schlund,  By thy unfathom’d gulfs of guile,
Bei dem so tugendsam scheinenden Auge,  By that most seeming virtuous 
eye,
Bei der verschlossenen Seele Trug,  By thy shut soul’s hypocrisy;
Bei der Vollendung Deiner Künste,  By the perfection of thine art
Dem Wahn, Du tragest ein menschliches Herz,  Which pass’d for human thine 
own heart;
Bei Deinem Gefallen an Anderer Pein,  By thy delight in others’ pain,
Bei Deiner Cains-Bruderschaft   And by thy brotherhood of Cain,
Beschwöre ich Dich und nötige   I call upon thee! and compel
Dich selbst Dir eigene Hölle zu sein!   Thyself to be thy proper Hell!
(Goethe, MA 13.1: 473)   (Byron 61, 242–51)
84Where Byron bends the meter without breaking it by beginning every verse with an 
anacrusis and uniformly arranging the otherwise irregular verse ends with a stressed 
syllable, Goethe falls back, like in Faust, on a different, relatively unadorned and rare 
stanzaic form of the sixteenth-century hymn. On the stanzaic form of the hymn see 
Frank. Handbuch der deutschen Strophenformen: 708–09. The meter—iambic tetrameter with 
rhyming couplets—belongs, however, to the most frequent forms, especially in English. 
See Alden, Raymond Macdonald. English Verse. New York: Henry Holt, 1926: 160–73.
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In the last verse of this stanza, Goethe deviates from his rule not to 
change the ends of verses semantically. “Hell” is displaced from the 
end into the middle of the verse. Furthermore, it is also moved into 
the character, namely through the “Beschwöre ich,” a specifying 
translation of “call upon.” The incantation, which Goethe removes 
from the paratext, thus appears of all places in the center of the 
“Bannfluch” and displays once again Goethe’s inversion of speech 
acts. While Manfred still relies on the curse for summoning spirits, in 
Goethe’s translation it is now the curse that uses an incantation of all 
the things to seal Manfred’s fate. This movement into the character 
should be taken seriously and shows that Goethe certainly recognized 
how Manfred pursues a psychologization and internalization of his 
Faust. This internalization is on display even in the verse structure 
of the “Bannfluch.” At the same time, the curse remains ambiguous, 
just like the character’s end.85 For, in contrast to Faust, Manfred is not 
saved. If one only takes outer events into account, his fate remains 
just as much in the dark as his end is unmotivated. However, if one 
considers the psychology of the character, which the curse so potently 
summons, then his end is everything but unmotivated. The curse 
accordingly functions not as a prophecy that is fulfilled in the course 
of the drama on the level of plot, but rather as the establishment of an 
inner life that determines the character and the progress of the plot.
Beyond that, the transformation that Goethe undertakes with the 
framing of the “Bannfluch” is not only displayed in the title. In con-
trast to the short review, into which Goethe inserts his translation 
from the second scene of the second act and which is published in 
Über Kunst und Altertum in 1820, he only frames the “Bannfluch” with 
an article about Justus Möser and superstition. This text, published in 
1823 also in Über Kunst und Altertum, is at first entirely devoted to the 
historian. The occasion was the announcement that further install-
ments of Möser’s Osnabrückische Geschichte were to be printed from the 
unpublished manuscripts. To illustrate his esteem, Goethe offers a 
loose citation of Möser that bears the heading “Über den Aberglauben 
unserer Vorfahren” (Goethe, MA 13.1: 470), which he then also com-
ments on positively. In this text, superstition is not primarily harmful 
and not at all an expression of ignorance in unenlightened ages. 
In the form of “belehrende[n] Fabeln” (470), it is, on the contrary, 
even useful and above all contributes to the moral development 
of “Kindern,” especially of “eitlen Mädchen” and “Gesinde” (470). 
85McVeigh, Daniel M. “Manfred’s Curse.” Studies in English Literature, 1500–1900 22.4 
(1982): 601–22, here 606–07.
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As a “Poesie des Lebens” (471), superstition is excusable and even 
useful in the form of frommen Fabeln with their angels and devils. To 
fight superstition means to guard onself against “Zauberstricke[ ],” 
“die sich immer stärker zusammenziehn, jemehr man sich gegen sie 
sträubt” (471). Goethe accordingly announces his translation of the 
“Bannfluch” as a “wahres Muster, wo die tiefsten sittlichen Gefühle 
unter psychischer Form sich in Aberglauben verwandeln, durch des-
sen Darstellung der Dichter sich selbst so vorsätzlich als ungläubig 
Schauder zu erregen trachtet” (471). In Byron’s Manfred, there are 
admittedly few traces of deep moral feelings that turn into supersti-
tions and are quasi-cathartically made innocuous in a program of 
moral education. On the contrary, the curse is intensified instead of 
weakened in Goethe’s translation through the techniques of the sixth 
stanza, and the downfall of the protagonist appears, as opposed to 
the second part of Faust, as everything but improbable. The power 
of the curse remains unabated on the level of poetic articulation, 
despite the fact that Goethe tries to exorcize it through the essay 
on superstition in early modernity. Goethe’s recognition of the true 
scandal of Manfred points to a deliberate ellipsis beyond the curse. For, 
when Manfred sees his beloved Astarte again in the fourth scene of 
the second act, Goethe’s fragmentary translation tellingly skips over 
the twenty verses that hint at incest between Astarte and Manfred.86 
At the mere intimation of incest—still the mythological short cut to 
blood revenge before its psychologization—even the label of supersti-
tion and its power are no longer of any help. Despite all its framings, 
this curse cannot be rendered harmless.
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86Zemanek. “Falsche Spiegelung“: 166.
